Moving Target Defense(MTD) has emerged as a good solution to alter the asymmetric situation of attacks and defenses, shuffling-based moving target defense has been regarded as one of the most effective ways to mitigate DDoS attacks. However, previous work did not notice that frequent shuffles will significantly intensify the overhead. The MTD technique requires a quantitative measure to compare the cost and effectiveness of available adaptations and explore the best trade-off between them. In this paper, therefore, we propose a novel cost-effective shuffling method against DDoS attacks using MTD. By exploiting Multi-Objective Markov Decision Processes to model the interaction between the attacker and the defender and designing a cost-effective shuffling algorithm, we study the best trade-off between the effectiveness and cost of shuffling in a given shuffling scenario. Finally, simulation and experiment on an experimental SDN network indicate that, our approach imposes an acceptable shuffling overload and has a good effect on resisting DDoS attacks.
Introduction
The static nature of cyber systems allows adversaries to not only plan and perform reconnaissance on the target system, but also scan the attack surface for any possible vulnerabilities, and then, at the right time, to launch an attack effectively. Traditional defense strategy targeting one-shot attacks with known types is inefficient and insufficient in the face of more advanced attacks with unique behavioral patterns. In order to improve the effectiveness of defense, Moving Target Defense (MTD) [1] has emerged as a good solution to deal with security issues associated with the static nature of current computer systems. The main idea of MTD is to mitigate the asymmetric advantage of attackers and raise the bar for their successful attacks. This mechanism essentially dynamically changes certain aspects of the system in a controlled manner of defenders to increase the attacker's uncertainty about target system, which in turn increases attack cost/complexity and reduces the chance of a successful exploit in a given amount of time.
On one hand, the higher the frequency of successive moves is, the shorter the time an attacker has available to launch a successful attack. On the other hand, this method has negative effects on the protected system by reducing the quality of service (QoS) and producing the extra cost due to frequent moves. In addition, using a terrible move may transfer the attack surface to a new surface, which is more vulnerable than the current one. Therefore, the MTD technique requires a quantitative measure to compare the cost and effectiveness of available adaptations and explore the best trade-off between them.
In this paper, therefore, we propose a novel costeffective shuffling method against DDoS attacks using MTD. First, we describe a threat model to characterize the behaviors of the attacker and defender. Then, we exploit Multi-Objective Markov Decision Processes to model the interaction between the attacker and the defender as a game, including description of the game process, definition of the game payoff and generation Regular Paper of the game strategy. In the last, we propose the shuffling scenario and give our cost-effective shuffling algorithm(CES). The goal of CES is to find the optimal strategy for a sequence of shuffling decisions to reach the trade-off between the effectiveness and cost of shuffling. Simulation and experiment results manifest that CES can effectively shuffle with limited cost in SDN and has a good effect on resisting DDoS attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related work in Section 2 and propose the threat model in Section 3. Model specification and detailed analysis of the game are presented in Section 4. Description of the shuffling scenario and algorithm are presented in Section 5. The performance of our proposed method is evaluated via simulation and experiment in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Related Work
Existing researches on the MTD switching method can be classified into random, event-based and hybrid classes. There are many pieces of early research on the random mutation [2−6] . Each move in the random mutation occurs after a particular time interval where the time interval could be random or periodic. Contrast to random mutation, the moves in event-based mutation [7−9] require auxiliary information such as security alerts and security policies. Once receiving an event, the attack surface will be modified in an adaptive manner. The hybrid mutation is a kind of mixed approach which consists of the random mutation and event-based mutation. Several researchers pro-posed a hybrid MTD model. Huang and Ghosh [10] proposed a rotational schema composed of several diversified servers which provide the same functionality. Based on randomly selected or event-driven, an online web server can be replaced by another standby server to resist attackers. Kampanakis et al. [11] proposed a kind of net-work-level MTD techniques which includes a hybrid mutation engine based on software defined networking (SDN).
Some research works were proposed to evaluate MTD mechanisms by quantifying the changes on the attack surface and assessing the cost and effectiveness of the mutation. To assess the effectiveness of MTD techniques, Hong and Kim [12] introduced a hierarchical attack representative model which is rather more flexible and scalable than common attack graphs. Bopche and Mehtre [13] employed classical graph distance metrics such as maximum common subgraph (MCS) and graph edit distance(GED) to measure temporal changes in attack surface of dynamic networks.
In addition, some researchers adopted game theory as a tool to model the interaction between the attacker and the defender and determine the selection of MTD move strategy. Prakash and Wellman [14] employed empirical and game theoretic techniques to examine the interaction between the attacker and the defender and demonstrated that the efficiency of MTD is sensitive to the detection capability. Although they realized that security alerts play an important role in effective move se-lection, the cost of the moves was ignored. Feng et al. [15] proposed a Bayesian Stackelberg game that models the joint migration and signaling strategies for the defender in the face of a strategic and rational attacker and demonstrated that MTD can be improved through strategic information disclosure. Although the proposed model passed theoretical analysis and numerical study, the effectiveness in real world was still uncertain.
Threat Model
In this section, we describe a threat model to characterize the behavior of attackers and moving target defense mechanism. This theoretical framework follows the state-of-the-art MTD model proposed by Lin et al. [16] .
Attacker Behavior
A strategic and rational attacker, with the objective of attacking the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the attack target, always needs to learn some sensitive information parameters about the defenders before launching a successful attack. To gain knowledge of the defenders, an attacker may take time and computing or monetary resources to explore the protected system. Once the attacker supposes that he has obtained enough information about the defender, the attack will be launched and the kind of attack behaviors will be synthetically decided by current system state and defense behaviors. Whatever successfully or not, the whole procedure including probing and launching refers to attack cost.
Defense Mechanism
In this paper, we focus on shuffle based MTD techniques that can be implemented at a network level. Therefore, the defense mechanism is defined as follows. Once one or several hosts in the protected system are compromised, in order to prevent the follow-up, the defender will shuffle the exploited hosts by the following defense types.
• Port hopping: Dynamic and continuous change of port number of a particular service.
• IP hopping: The defender changes the IP address of a VM dynamically and incessantly.
• Migration: The defender migrates the applications or services under attack between VMs.
Objective
The objective of this paper about cost-effective shuffling MTD method is to investigate the optimal way for a defender to make adaptations, taking into account of both the shuffling/attack cost and effectiveness between defender and attacker. It is quite reasonable for a defender to endure risks with no shuffling, if the shuffling cost is high while the effectiveness is low. We seek to answer the question of what the best way is to make the shuffling decision and how to reach the best tradeoff between cost and effectiveness.
Game Model
In the following, we exploit Multi-Objective Markov Decision Processes (MOMDP) [16] to model the interaction between the attacker and the defender as a game in which each player aims to maximize his payoff. The shuffling selection process can be modeled as a sequential game in which the defender is the leader and the attacker is the follower. A MOMDP for two objectives in our case is a tuple (t, S, O, A, D, R, C, γ), where:
• t is the time step of a game, and t = {0, ..., T } where T is the time horizon.
• S represents a finite set of states,including all possible attack surfaces that the protected system could experience and let S t be the state of the system at time step t.
• O represents the condition of services or VMs by defender's observation with confidence coefficient π ∈ [0, 1].
• A denotes a finite set of attacker actions, and let A t be the attacker's action at time step t. D denotes a finite set of defender actions, and let D t be the defender's action at time step t.
• R: S×A(D)×S → R is a rewarding function that maps a state and an action to a reward for the player.
• C: A(D) → C assigns a cost to each action the players take.
• γ is the discount factor where γ ∈ (0, 1].
In this game, the defender adopts a MTD strategy by migrating the resource across the network to make it difficult for the attacker to identify the real location of the resource,while the attacker may observe the defender's actions by monitoring network traffic. Knowing this strategy (but not its realization), the attacker then determines which VM to conduct DDoS attack or not and which IP address to choose.In addition, the defender can also obtain the state of the protected system and attacker's actions by observation. Thus, both of them will play their best strategy to act against his opponent and to maximize his payoff.
Game Process
At the beginning of the game, S 0 , A 0 and D 0 need to be initialized with ∅. Based on our assumption, the attacker is fully aware of states at every time step, whereas the defender only knows the initial state S 0 .
Thus, we also set O 0 = ∅. At each time step t+1 ∈ {1, ..., T }, the attacker can decide which feasible VMs to attempt and choose any VM v ∈ V to conduct DDoS attack with a success probability p(v), and p(v,v') from VM v to v' if attacker has taken control of v. Simultaneously, the defender decides which VMs to shuffle to prevent the attacker from intruding further.
After the initialization, the game proceeds in discrete time steps, t+1 ∈ {1, ..., T }, with both players aware of the current time. The following sequence of game events occurs at each time step t+1.
(1)The attacker observes S t , while the defender ob-
(2)The attacker and defender select their actions A t+1 and D t+1 according to their respective strategies at the same time.
(3)The system transitions to its next state S t+1 according to the transition function(Algorithm 1).
(4)The attacker and defender respectively evaluate their rewards and costs for the time step.
Algorithm 1 State Transition Function

Input:
The system state at time step t, S t ; The observation by defender at time step t, O t ;
The defender action at time step t + 1, D t+1 ;
The attacker action at time step t + 1, A t+1 ; Output:
The system state probability distribution at time step t + 1, S t+1 with probability p;
with probability p(v), S t+1 (v) ← 1;
end if 8: else 9:
12:
with probability p(v), S t+1 (v) ← 1; 
end for 20: end if 21: end if
Game Payoff
As discussed in section 4.1 Game process, S t is a system state at time t, when the attacker plays A t , the defender plays D t and the previous system state is S t−1 . Hence, we denote by
} the game history, which consists of all system states and players' actions at each time step. After all of the players have taken actions in the game, each of them will get either a negative or a positive return. It is the quantitative result of each player's action which represents the game payoff. In MTD, both the attacker and the defender need to take the payoffs into consideration. Each player then may receive a different payoff function and aims to increase the expected payoff. With respect to H T , the defender and attacker's game payoffs, which include goal rewards and action costs, can be separately presented as follows:
Game Strategy
As discussed above, both players will play their best strategies to act against the opponent and aim to maximize the value of payoff function P , which is closely related to the distribution of H T . In spite of game payoff, to analyze the game process more meticulously, heuristic strategies for both players are proposed in this section to depict detailed actions between them.
Attacker Strategy
For the attacker, at time step t + 1, based on S t , he needs to consider only VM v ∈ V that can change the target system state at t + 1 to attempt. Hence, we denote by α(S t ) the potential attack target at time t + 1 which represents this set of VMs and consists of two parts as follows:
(1)Target on VM v directly to launch an attack; (2)Target on another VM v ′ which with probability to reach v.
Based on the two parts of VMs discussed above, we obtain α(S t ) defined as follows:
Since the attacker is rational in our assumption, the attack strategies choose actions based on a quantitative assessment of game payoffs with α(S t ). Intuitively, the value of an attack payoff quantitatively represents what the attacker can obtain by this attack at the time step. The main idea of this strategy is to choose the attack target whose payoff is maximum based on previous system state at each time step. However, due to lack of knowledge about defender action at this time step, the payoff which the attacker calculates is biased based on his unilateral action. This attack strategy generation is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Attack Strategy Generation
Input:
The system state at time step t, S t ; Output:
The attacker action at time step t + 1,
Update v ∈ P a (v);
7:
Retain v ∈ P a (v);
11:
else 12:
Update v ∈ P a (v); 
Defender Strategy
For the defender, at each time step, since he does not know the true system states, it is crucial for him to reason about possible system states based on his observations before choosing defense actions. As mentioned in the section 4.1, in our game, the defender only knows the initial system state S 0 , where S 0 (v) = 0 for each v ∈ V . Different from attacker strategy, at each time step, the defender needs to take both his observation and the attacker strategy by his assumption into consideration, which guides his awareness of current system state. Similarly, we denote by β(O t ) the potential def end target at time t + 1 which represents this set of target VMs as follows:
(1)Target on VM v according to defender's observation O t ;
(2)Target on VM which is not in D t but will belong to A t+1 .
According to contents above, we obtain β(O t ) defined as follows:
Algorithm 3 Defend Strategy Generation
Input:
The observation by defender at time step t, O t ;
The defender action at time step t, D t ; The number of VMs, n; Output:
The defender action at time step t + 1,
Retain v ∈ P d (v);
6:
8:
end if 10: end for 11: for O t (v) = 0 and v / ∈ D t (v) do 12:
15:
17: 
As a rational defender, before making strategies, he also needs to assess the game payoffs of imminent actions with β(O t ). Essentially, the quantitative assessment of the game payoffs for defender represents the level of the strategy to fight against attacker's malicious actions at this time step. The higher the value of the defend payoffs, the safer the protected system will be.
Similar to the attacker, what the defender needs to do is to observe the system state and choose the optimal defend strategy at each time step. However, without knowledge about attack action at each time step, the defender needs to assume attacker's possible action at next time step from his observation at current time step and synthetically generate defend strategy by comparing the payoff function, which is illustrated in Algorithm 3.
Cost-Effective Shuffling Method
As discussed above, we give the definition of the game model and describe the game process and game strategies between both players. However, only based on these theories, the game may reach a equilibrium which is indecisive and undesirable for the defender. To make the game more beneficial for the defender and reach the best trade-off between shuffling cost and defense effectiveness, in this section, we propose a cost-effective shuffling method, which consists of threat model and game theory, to adopt different shuffling types under different conditions.
Shuffling Scenario
To increase the applicability of our shuffling method and expound the details more clearly, we make some assumptions and propose the shuffling scenario as follows.
Given: a set of q users and a group of n VMs with r network segments and u ports of equal resources for m users, where m × n = q, r n Output: three sequences of matrices
The matrices X t represent the IP shuffling decision at time step t, where binary variable x t ij indicates that whether the i-th VM is assigned to j-th network segment. Hence, Equation 4a states that each network segment owns at least one VM, and Equation 4b ensures that each VM is assigned to only one network segment. Similarly, The matrices Y t represent the port shuffling decision at time step t, where binary variable y t ij indicates that whether the i-th VM is assigned to j-th port.
Hence, we can easily get Equation 4c which indicates that at most n VMs share the same port number.
As the VM migration is the third shuffling mechanism, the matrices Z t denote the overall condition of VM migration at time step t and the binary variable z t ij represents that whether the j-th user is assigned to i-th VM. Based on Equation 4d and Equation 4e, we can conclude that each user is assigned to only one VM and each VM can only be allowed to serve m users.
Cost-Effective Shuffling Algorithm
In the following, we first present a cost-effective shuffling algorithm to consider the cost and effective of shuffling. Specifically, in the initial assignment step , q users, r network segments and u ports are randomly assigned to n VMs, whereas the t-th shuffling step iteratively reduces the number of the crashed VMs.
Afterwards, the the system state at time step t represents the assignment of users, network segments, ports in the system and the condition of crashed VMs through state transition function(Algorithm 1), which requires the defender's and attacker's strategies as the input. As discussed in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3, the generation of strategies is directly related to the rewards and costs of their actions.
Hence, the defender's rewarding value R d t+1 and cost value C d t+1 at each time step t with state transition function ST F represent the effectiveness and cost of a shuffle as follows:
(5b) Regarding shuffling effectiveness, the rewarding function in Equation 5a includes the reduced number of crashed VMs in a shuffle from time step t to t + 1. In terms of IP hopping, port hopping and traffic redirection cost in a shuffle, the cost function in Equation 5b represents the number of shuffling network segments, port numbers and VMs, where w 1 , w 2 , w 3 is different weights assigned by the network operator.
Algorithm 4 Cost-Effective Shuffling Algorithm
Input:
The state of VMs by defender's observation at time step t,
A binary r × n-matrix X t ; A binary u × n-matrix Y t ; A binary q × n-matrix Z t ; The number of online users in each VM,
A binary r × n-matrix X t+1 ; A binary u × n-matrix Y t+1 ; A binary q × n-matrix Z t+1 ;
Find maximum γ 
Find maximum 
However, in an actual scenario, not all users are online at the same time and unnecessary shuffling costs are generated during each time step. In order to decrease the extra costs, we denote the number of online users in one VM by η to guide the defender to make his decision in a more cost-effective manner, where 0 η m. Therefore, we name our algorithm CES(cost-effective shuffling). CES(Algorithm 4) aims to significantly reduce the unnecessary cost and find the optimal trade-off between the effectiveness and cost.
Evaluations and Results
In this section, we evaluate the cost-effectiveness performance of the proposed CES algorithm against DDoS attacks. First, we describe the simulation settings and compare our CES algorithm with other shuffling algorithm in existence. Then we introduce the experimental settings. Finally, we measure the cost and effectiveness of our proposed CES algorithm in shuffling scenario with comparisons to non-shuffling strategy and random shuffling strategy.
Simulation
In the following, we compare the proposed algorithm with RRT [18] and CSA [16] to evaluate the effectiveness and cost of shuffling. To find the system state transition probability, we first implement Algorithm 1 and execute it 10000 times with pre-defined parameters (m, n, q, r, u), where m = 20, n = 50, q = 1000, r = 20, u = 100. Afterward, we compare the expected value functions of CES with that of RRT and CSA in terms of effectiveness, cost, and payoff. Note that RRT is indifferent to the online users of the VMs and CSA randomly selects half of the users to move in a single shuffle. Hence, in the simulation, the parameter η is not fixed and ranges from 0 to 20. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 first compare different algorithms with different time step and different number of average online users in one VM, respectively. In Fig. 1 , 1000 users are involved in the shuffling scheme, and the system is able to allocate at most 50 VMs for shuffling. In Fig. 2 , there are 0 to 20 online users in one VM at time step 10. Fig. 1 demonstrates that the shuffling approach performs better when the time step increases whereas Fig. 2 manifests that the advantage of the shuffling approach decreases when the number of average online users in one VM increases. Fig. 1a and Fig.  2a present the effectiveness of shuffling, Fig. 1b and Fig. 2b show the cost of shuffling, where the weights of IP hopping, port hopping and migration are set to 0.2, 0.1 and 0.7 here. The simulation results in Fig.  1c and Fig. 2c demonstrate that payoff of CES significantly outperforms those of RRT and CSA, where the discount value γ is set to 0.9 here.
For the effectiveness of shuffling, Fig. 1a and Fig.  2a indicate that more effectiveness is gained when the time step increases, and more users lead to less shuffling effectiveness for the given time step. The effectiveness of shuffling in CES outperforms the one in RRT and CSA due to the following two reasons. First, the system state transition probability of CES fully take the correlation between states into consideration. Second, CES adapt three kinds of shuffling mechanism whereas RRT and CSA only choose a single shuffling method. For the shuffling cost, Fig. 1b and Fig. 2b indicate that the shuffling cost linearly decreases when the time step increases and dramatically increases due to the increase of online users.To consider both the effectiveness and cost, our proposed algorithm still outperforms RRT and CSA in the shuffling payoff, respectively in Fig. 1c and Fig. 2c .
Experimental Settings
We implement the shuffling scenario in an experimental SDN [19] network. The network that we use for experimental analysis is composed of 5 Dell PowerEdge R720 servers and a Dell PowerEdge R430 server.Each Dell PowerEdge R720 has 32 GB of RAM, 4 TB hard disk storage and 12 core CPU. Dell PowerEdge R430 has 16 GB RAM, 1 TB disk storage and 4 core CPU.
One single server is employed to construct the control platform, using Opendaylight [20] based SDN controller and PHP Laravel web framework as frontend.For the virtual network deployment, we utilize Openstack [21] for compute and network resource provisioning on the other two physical servers. The VMs of physical servers are managed and controlled by SDN controller via Open vSwitch [22] . In the implementation, we create 50 VMs which are equally allocated to five servers, and each VM is assigned for at most 20 users with equal CPU and memory. In addition, the 50 VMs are arranged with different IP and TCP ports, where the attacker overload the VMs through DDoS attack tools.
Results
First, we implement our CES algorithm and execute the program as an application on the control platform. Then we compare our cost-effective shuffling method with non-shuffling and random shuffling scenario.
Overhead of SDN Controller's CPU Load
To evaluate the processing overhead of SDN controller consumed by the shuffling scenario, we use packets of different lengths to communicate and evaluate the influence to SDN controller's CPU load with comparison to non-shuffling and random shuffling scenarios, which is shown in Fig. 3 . The extra CPU load is about 2.1 %-4.8 % comparing to non-shuffling scenario and about 1.2 %-2.2 % comparing to random shuffling scenario. Hence, according to the evaluation results, the extra processing overhead of SND controller is not heavy, which is in an acceptable security overhead range while the CES is taken to protect communication process against DDoS attack. 
Overhead of the Shuffling Process
To evaluate the overhead of each shuffle consumed by the shuffling scenario, we use the time consumption of strategy generation and shuffling procedure to represent the overhead of the shuffling process, which is shown in Fig. 4 . In general, the results indicate that our approach requires 3.82-3.97s in each shuffle, including strategy generation and shuffling procedure, which is acceptable for users to wait for the restart of services. In addition, due to changes of the system state and the expansion of strategies, the time consumption of strategy generation increases when the time step increases. On the contrary, there is a slight decrease on the time consumption of shuffling procedure. 
Evaluation of Resisting DDoS Attacks
To evaluate the capability of the cost-effective shuffling scenario to resist DDoS attacks, we construct a typical SYN (synchronize) flood DDoS attack tool using hping3 [23] and carry out DDoS attack to the protected VMs one by one. In this experiment, we also compare our proposed cost-effective shuffling method with nonshuffling and random shuffling respectively. Test result is shown in Fig. 5 .
It can be seen from Fig. 5 that when suffering from DDoS attack, the non-shuffling and random shuffling cannot protect the system being attacked, whereas our proposed cost-effective shuffling method can quickly recover the protected system with effective shuffle, and can effectively guarantee the services are available to the online users. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we explore a cost-effective method in the shuffling-based moving target defense scenario against DDoS attacks. We model the interaction between the attacker and defender with Multi-Objective Markov Decision Processes and design the game process with game payoff and strategy. Then, we design a cost-effective shuffling method to find the best trade-off between shuffling cost and defense effectiveness. Simulation results indicate that our proposed CES effectively balances the trade-off between the two objectives, and experiment results manifest that our approach imposes an acceptable shuffling overload and has a good effect on resisting DDoS attacks.
The next step is to introduce other technologies of moving target defense (such as service hopping, path hopping, etc.) to SDN network proactive defense system. In addition, making full use of the characteristics of game theory, multi-stage game between the attacker and defender will be further studied.
